Zhukov recovered Gomel. From the perspective of later generations, this battle is of great significance.↗, starting from Gomel's battle, the Red Army completely reversed the passiveness caused by Tukhachevsky's mistakes in the early stage, and moved from defense to attack. To be precise, it moved from defense to attack.

As the German army implemented the highest instructions of the head of state on the Eastern Front and used fortresses and fortress tactics to fight against the Red Army's dominant corps, the German army had already fallen into a passive attack on the Eastern Front. Of course, this situation was not obvious at the beginning, and Hitler tried to counterattack every few days, but as the Red Army's advantage became increasingly greater, the frequency and intensity of the German counterattack became lower and lower, and it was increasingly impossible to cause trouble for the Red Army.

In other words, since Gomel's battle, the failure of the German army was already doomed. When the weapons and personnel they produced and supplemented could not keep up with the consumption of the front line, there was only a dead end.

The Red Army and the CPPCC also discovered this trend, so in addition to ordering Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Konev and Huasilevsky on the front line to kill the Germans, the CPPCC once again strengthened the strategic bombing of the German hinterland. The CPPCC discovered that using strategic bombing was enough to offset more than 25% of the German army's production capacity, and it was undoubtedly much more expensive to eliminate these 25% of the enemy on the front line.

Therefore, starting from May 1943, the Military Commission adjusted the production proportion of air force weapons, and the long-range aviation force increased from only 20% of the air force before that to 30%. It once again asked Tupolev to use the fastest speed to produce new long-range bombers with larger bomb loads and longer ranges.

As the Red Army strengthened strategic bombing, a major offensive and defensive battle surrounding long-range bombers began. In order to resist the strategic bombing of the Red Army, the German army continuously enhanced interceptors and air defense firepower, striving to capture more heavy bombers. The Red Air Force made a big fuss about escort and reducing losses. The escort system and guidance weapons that were later proven to be very effective were constantly improved in that context.

Of course. In addition to hard killing methods, the Germans also constantly tried to use soft killing methods to disintegrate and weaken the Red Army's strategic bombing threat. And this is the main story to be told today's electronic warfare!

Comrades should be familiar with electronic warfare. In fact, the Red Army used electronic warfare methods to bomb Ploiest before, but the most successful electronic warfare in history did not belong to the Soviet Union, but the masterpiece of the US imperialist death place. Comrades may be more familiar with electronic warfare during Operation Desert Storm, but we must first start with Vietnam.

Historically, on July 24, 1965, as the Soviet Union delivered a large number of S75m (Sam 2) surface-to-air missiles to North Vietnam, the losses of the US Air Force in bombing North Vietnam rose sharply. By the end of 1965, nearly one-third of the 90 fighter jets from five squadrons of the US Air Force base in Thailand lost nearly one-third.

The ultra-high combat loss rate made the Americans unable to sit still, so they immediately conducted research on the s75m system. After several months of reconnaissance and understanding the technical performance and tactical application of the s75m, the US military urgently improved the qr-160a-1 electronic interference pod based on the newly developed qr-160 electronic interference pod.

Logically speaking, the pilots of the US Air Force should welcome this new equipment very much, because after testing, this pod can indeed greatly reduce the threat of s75m. But what is confusing is that the American pilot refused to install the QR-160a-1 electronic interference pod on his plane, with the reason: "We don't have time to learn this new thing. We have to throw steel to the goal!"

Yes, the US Air Force pilots rejected this new equipment under the pretext of busy missions and the electronic interference pod occupying valuable bomb mounts. The pilots fundamentally doubted the actual role of this interference pod. They did not understand the importance of electronic warfare, fearing that after loading the pod, they would affect maneuvering and fewer bombs. This directly caused the QR-160a-1 electronic interference pod distributed to the front line to be locked into the warehouse and became moldy, and almost no pilot was willing to take it to the air to fight.

However, American pilots soon learned a lesson. In July and August 1966, as Vietnam's air defense missiles grew, the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing's combat losses peaked. In these two disastrous months, the Wing lost a total of 27 105 aircraft, accounting for half of its total aircraft.

The harsh combat environment changed the minds of front-line pilots. They were finally willing to install the QR-160a-1 electronic jamming pod in accordance with the regulations to launch the air combat. So what is the effect? ​​It is amazingly good. On October 8, the US military attacked the oil storage area of ​​the Wuxi River in Vietnam. In this extremely dangerous combat operation, Vietnam's surface-to-air missile forces never attack aircraft with pods and perform interference, but instead concentrated their firepower to attack formations without interference.

After this battle, the American pilots realized that they were rushing to install interference pods on their planes, without interference pods or even refused to take off to perform missions. There is a data that can also illustrate the success of the electronic interference pod. Six months before using the QR-160a-1 electronic interference pod, the US military was shot down 72 105 aircraft. Six months after using the pod, even if the number of air defense missiles in North Vietnam rose sharply, the US military still lost only 105 aircraft.

Why tell this story? In addition to explaining the importance of electronic warfare, it is more important to clarify a point of view. Advanced tactical ideas and advanced weapons are equally important. If the latter is the case, the former cannot keep up.

You should know that the United States carried out outstanding electronic warfare as early as during World War II and formulated a number of corresponding tactics. During the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan, the US Air Force can be said to have experienced a comprehensive and high-intensity electronic warfare. However, even under such a premise, the pilots of the US Air Force still had a weak understanding of the importance of electronic warfare during the Vietnam War, and their concepts were outdated and shocking.

Alfred Price, the author of "A History of Electronic Warfare in the United States", concluded: "No matter how powerful the role of electronic warfare is at any critical moment, within ten years, a large number of new generations of silly bird pilots who believe that aircraft performance and flying technology can ensure the survival of aircraft." He also said: "After a certain period of time, the composition of the three armed forces of the army, navy and air force will undergo major changes. The experienced older generation has retired or transferred to other jobs. There is no chance to use the knowledge he has gained in combat. Those who replace them will not have these experiences unless they participate in combat! Everything must start from scratch!"

Please note that this still represents the world's advanced level of the United States. What is the state of the Soviet Union? To be honest, except for the group of senior executives led by Li Xiaofeng, who attaches importance to the development of electronic technology, most of the middle and lower-level pilots, especially those grassroots pilots, have no concept of electronic warfare at all, and do not even think that this is useful or necessary!

In fact, electronic warfare is not cold and did not appear in World War II. The earliest "electronic warfare" was born shortly after the emergence of radio. However, this earliest "electronic warfare" was first applied to commercial competition (it is indeed money that drives the first force).

In September 1901, the US Cup sailing competition, which was of great interest to the public, was held in the United States. Whoever could report the competition first could gain huge economic benefits. Both Marconi and the American Radio Company signed contracts with relevant units to report the competition situation using radio.

In order to seize the business opportunity, the American Radio Company came up with a bad move. The company developed a transmitter that was much more powerful than other competitors. Every once in a while, it sent a "long stroke" of ten seconds, which means that the USS Columbia was ahead. Launching two such "long strokes" means that the British sailing ship Shamlock was ahead, and sending three "long strokes" means that both sides were running side by side.

It seems that some comrades said that this has nothing to do with electronic warfare! Don't worry, I'm not saying it at the beginning, has the American Radio Company developed a higher power transmitter? The secret of electronic warfare has something to do with this transmitter. You should know that the spectrum range of signals transmitted by the radio spark transmitter is very wide, and someone soon discovered that when transmitting a message, the signals interfere with each other in each receiver.

High-power transmitters naturally have advantages over low-power transmitters. Therefore, in order to keep the report ahead, American Radio Company deliberately continued to hold the transmitter power tightly after sending a message, and continued to transmit radio waves, which directly caused all other wireless receivers to stop.

The first time in history in the use of electronic warfare in war was actually closely related to Russia. In the Russian-Japanese War in 1904, the Japanese armoured cruisers of Kasuga and Rijin were prepared to shell out Russian warships in the Lushun military port. However, the Russian ships hid in the port, and the Kasuga and Rijin had difficulty observing, so they could only send a small destroyer close to the military port to observe and guide the shelling.

When the Japanese destroyer used radio to indicate its cruiser for the first time, it was intercepted by the Russian radio operator. The operator immediately realized the importance of this signal, so he immediately turned on the radio transmitter to interfere with it. Because the Japanese cruiser could not obtain target instructions, he could only shoot blindly, and naturally there was no result.

During World War II, with the great military value of radio equipment, electronic warfare became increasingly necessary. Electronic warfare in World War II first started between Britain and Germany. In July 1940, after the London bombing began, the Germans soon realized that they had to first destroy Britain's local chain radar network.

The tall, bulky and prominent local chain radar soon suffered serious losses in the German lightning air strike. Seeing that the German army was about to succeed, the British would pay a heavy price. The British came up with a trick. The British asked the radar transmitter to continue working, which made the German army mistakenly believe that the air strike did not work. After several consecutive times, the Germans gave up on continuing to bomb the local chain radar on a large scale.

What about it in fact?

In fact, this is a scam. Only a considerable number of local chain radars are intact, while the receiver is destroyed during bombing. In other words, these radar light can emit radio waves but cannot receive them, so naturally no target can be discovered.

Of course, the Germans were not 25. After they found that using hard killing means "do not work", they began to seek soft killing means. In September 1940, they established a ground radar jamming station on Mount Pukur, which was facing Calais, and equipped with several Brellaus jamming machines.

The antennas of these jammers face opposite the strait, with a transmission power of 1 kilowatts. They work in the 22 to 50 MHz frequency band used by local chain radars, and are used to interfere with local chain radars. Of course, the Germans' work is still a bit rough because they do not know the performance of local chain radars. They are not clear about how to interfere with local chain radars as early as 1938. And they have long installed anti-jamming devices. Therefore, the Germans' initial interference operations were not very successful.

It was not until a year later that after a large number of wireless reconnaissance and basically understood the performance of the local chain, Germany created a useful jammer and successfully helped Schánhorst, Gneisenau and Prince Eugen travel through the Dover Strait to return to Germany.

After telling so many historical stories, let's get back to the point, that is, the electronic warfare between the Red Army and the German army. When the Patriotic War broke out, the Red Army had already established radar stations that could basically cover the western front border. These radars provided great support for the air combat in 1941. Without them, the Red Army's losses would have been even heavier.

But in 1942, as the German army penetrated into Belarus and Ukraine, these radar stations were either transferred or forced to destroy themselves. Let's put it this way, in the first half of 1942, a big hole was opened in the Red Army's sky defense line. Fortunately, the Germans did not have much strategic bombing capabilities, otherwise the consequences would be unimaginable.

It was not until the second half of 1942 that the new radar station was established on the Russian front that the Red Army basically blocked the hole on the Western Front. However, the hole was not tightly blocked. Because Germany had learned experience from the electronic warfare with Britain, and these related experiences were also used to deal with the Red Army's air defense early warning radar.

Fortunately, the Soviet Union had a fairy who traveled through time. Li Xiaofeng instructed Nokia before the war to strengthen the research and development of radar and radio equipment. Therefore, in the second half of 1942, a new type of maneuverable early warning radar p12 was provided. This new type of radar made up for the shortcomings of the old radar, which made the German interference not successful.

At the same time, the Red Army did not blindly be beaten passively. In order to defeat Germany's air defense system and protect its own attack aircraft and bombers, the Red Army also took targeted measures.

In order to deal with the German Freya air alert radar, Nokia is producing a special interference device "big wave". This is an airborne pulse transponder, which works at the 125 MHz frequency where Freya is located. When the "big wave" receives Freya's radio wave, a wide pulse signal will be immediately returned. This signal is displayed on the radar display as a rhythmic beating waveform with amplitude modulation. Anyway, it looks like a large wave of fighter jets flying in dense formations.

To put it bluntly, this is a tactical deception. Electronic warfare aircraft equipped with the Giant Wave system can lure German fighter jets to the wrong direction, thereby reducing the losses of the real bomber group.

This is not all, because it is not enough to just interfere with the warning radar. When a bomber flies over the target, it must face the German ground air defense network. The Würzburg artillery radar equipped by the German anti-aircraft artillery troops is not at a frequency of 125 MHz, and the giant wave system is useless to it. This means that the bomber will still be tracked and aimed by the enemy's radar, and the German army can still use it to guide fighter jets and anti-aircraft artillery to attack the bomber group.

At the beginning, the Red Army had few solutions to the Würzburg radar. The problem was not solved until the KGB supernatural powers sent a signal flag special forces to snatch a Würzburg radar from the German radar station.

Nokia urgently developed a jammer lightning, which specifically interferes with Würzburg. Not only did it develop lightning, Nokia also suggested that the Red Army produce a large number of jam foil strips, which will work best with lightning.

At the beginning, the Red Army was very resistant to this, not to resist the lightning system, but to resist the use of interference foil. The reason is that the Red Army felt that it is not the time to use this "big killing weapon". Yes, you read that right, the Red Army did regard interference foil as a killing weapon, and store it in the warehouse as a secret weapon with a high level of confidentiality. It can only be put into use at the most critical moment.

The reason is naturally that the effect of interfering foil is too good. The Red Army is worried that once this killer is used, it will be copied by the Germans soon, and the Germans can be used to deal with the Soviet radar. To be honest, this idea made Li Xiaofeng laugh and cry because he knew very well that interfering foil was not a secret to the Germans. Historically, Germany, Britain and the United States developed passive interfering foil at almost the same time, and everyone unexpectedly maintained the same attitude towards this weapon, that is, hide it and treat it as a killer weapon, and never use it easily.

Historically, it was not until the end of July 1943 that the Allies used this weapon first after Churchill's approval. Of course, there was no need to wait for so long in this time and space. When bombing Ploiesti, at the suggestion of Li Xiaofeng, the Red Army first used the interference foil strips, which was very good.

Ironically, when Ploestti was bombed into ruins, no one from the most ordinary soldiers to the senior general knew what this kind of swaying metal strip was, and even ordered: "Don't touch those things, they are likely to be poisonous!"

Poor Hans, I really don't know what to say about them, but when the Red Army's strategic bombing became more and more fierce, and more and more use of interference foil, the Germans began to find ways to solve this difficult problem... (To be continued.) Mobile phone users, please visit http://m.piaotian.net
Chapter completed!