The unprecedented pressure from the people has forced Trotsky to consider more carefully whether to give up Kiev. At least from the current situation, giving up Kiev may lead to the Trotskyism being passive at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in February. It can be imagined that as long as he continues to give up Kiev, Sverdlov will definitely strongly criticize him at the conference and severely defeat the Trotskyism.

Then give up on this idea?

But what made Trotsky embarrassed was how Tukhachevsky explained that since November, this confidant has been constantly hit. He disappointed the confidant on several consecutive military issues. It is conceivable that Tukhachevsky is probably very annoyed. Once his attempt is shattered this time, will he give up the challenge?

Trotsky was in a dilemma at both ends. According to the current trend, there is no solution to the best of both worlds. What should I do?

Ulitsky, the last one who came up with a solution for Trotsky, suggested by his old partner: "We must never give up Kiev at present. Moreover, in order to counter Sverdlov's attack, we cannot not only mention giving up Kiev, but also actively rescue Kiev and lifting the siege of Kiev is the best fight against Sverdlov's accusations!"

"There are Tukhachevsky's side..."

To be honest, Ulitsky was very dissatisfied with Tukhachevsky's recent performance. The marshal, who was trusted by Trotsky, failed to use the opportunity of the Patriotic War to open up the situation for the Trotskyists. Not only did he fail to regain some of his military voice, but he became a laughing stock because of a series of mistakes, which led to fewer and fewer supporters of the Trotskyists in the military.

Ulitsky saw it and was anxious. Like Trotsky, he had to retire in 1945. According to Trotsky's vision, he was planning to replace him in this position. As long as Tukhachevsky performed well in the Patriotic War, his hope of entering the Politburo will increase greatly.

At that time, in the Politburo, the Trotskyists can maintain at least two seats (Radik and Tukhachevsky), and if Smirlov and Sokolinikov can also successfully support the three seats and one alternate seat. The Trotskyists can have at least five years of buffering time, so that they can complete the old and new alternation, and persist for a long time.

Now, Tukhachevsky, who has great hope, has lost all the time again and again. Even Ulitsky can't stand it. If Tukhachevsky continues to play badly, there will be only one result. In the next Politburo, the Trotskyist party may have only one seat! And this is quite dangerous!

In Ulitski's view, we cannot continue to put the eggs in the Tukhachevski basket. We should give newcomers more potential opportunities. There are still four years left, and if we operate properly, we can still succeed.

Did Trotsky know Ulitsky's idea? It should be clear, but Trotsky could not fully accept it. The reason is very simple. Trotsky saw it clearly. Who can gain an advantage in the Military Commission and who can gain a foothold in the Politburo. Without the support of the military, it is a rootless grass that cannot withstand the storm!

Now, the Trotskyist forces in the military are completely maintained by Tukhachevsky alone. If Tukhachevsky is abandoned, then the Trotskyist faction will continue to fight with the Lenin faction, and just one Li Xiaofeng can make a big splash for them. Trotsky really has no way to give up Tukhachevsky, not that he is unwilling, but that he cannot do that.

The question is. What should I do if I have to continue to support Tukhachevsky and avoid the big pit of Kiev? Ulitsky believes that there is only one way: "First save Kiev, then carry out the Minsk counterattack."

Ulitsky's reason is as follows: If we do not rescue Kiev now, we will fall into a full passive position and will be beaten by the Lenin faction. At that time, the Lenin faction, which has the advantage, will still promote the motion to rescue Kiev, and at that time, the wife will be compensated and the army will be lost.

Therefore, instead of being passively beaten, it is better to take the initiative to change, first cater to the needs of the public and rescue Kiev. After success, our Trotskyists will be able to escape from the passiveness and gain a little reputation. Of course, if they fail to rescue Kiev, there is no big problem. We just happened to fight back against the Lenin faction and criticize their decision to rescue Kiev. Anyway, no matter what, we will not suffer any loss.

As for the Minsk Battle advocated by Tukhachevsky, it can be placed after Kiev's rescue. If Kiev successfully rescues, it will inevitably bring a major blow to the German army and force some German troops to turn to Ukraine. In that case, the pressure on Minsk will be reduced. At that time, we will draw troops from Kiev to invest in the Minsk battlefield, and we may be able to defeat the enemy faster!

Ulitsky also believes that it is best to avoid winter when launching a counterattack in Minsk and counterattack after the weather warms up in May. It is more prepared and less disturbed by the weather. How great it is!

When Trotsky heard this, he made sense. He was well-off. He not only blocked the Leninist stinky mouth and took care of Tukhachevsky's mood. It's good, just do it!

Tukhachevsky was naturally not happy about this. In his opinion, when the Bryansk Front Army severely slashed the German spirit, Minsk launched a large-scale counterattack, which was the best. After the troops rescued Kiev, the Red Army was exhausted due to the continuous combat consumption, and the German Central Army Group recovered after a winter rest. What good results can be achieved when one goes up and down?

What's more, Tukhachevsky was not optimistic about being able to rescue Kiev. If the rescue failed and the Red Army was full of trouble, what would you talk about when you were talking about counterattacks? It would be a blessing to be able to hold your position.

Anyway, Tukhachevsky was quite dissatisfied with Ulitsky's proposal. The two sides quarreled at the Trotsky meetings, so that Ulitsky finally made harsh words, either accepting his suggestion or changing someone to be the chief of staff.

Tukhachevsky was almost leaving at that time, but in the end, Trotsky's persuasion and himself were unwilling to step down in shame, so he could only agree with Ulitsky's proposal.

First, they rescued Kiev and then launched a Minsk counterattack. As the final decision of the Politburo was determined. However, Tukhachevsky was not the only one who was dissatisfied with this strategy, but Li Xiaofeng actually did not agree.

"It is not easy to take it for granted, a typical politician-style thinking. It is difficult to remove the siege of Kiev. Isn't it even thinking that after the siege, I still launch a full-scale counterattack in another direction thousands of miles away? Isn't this talking to you!"

Ulitsky also agreed: "Since September 1941, our army has suffered serious losses. It was originally supposed to be replenishing the winter, and it was a bit more difficult to carry out a rescue battle, but it was actually unwise to fight continuously. What's more, the time for the Minsk Battle was not appropriate. In May, the weather seemed to be warmer, but the unblocking of frozen soil and the melting of ice and snow would inevitably make the road more muddy. At that time, the mechanized troops would not be able to perform at all, and this battle would be difficult to fight!"

Who said it was not? Russia in May was a big quagmire. It was really not suitable for military operations, otherwise the German army would not have carried out the Barbarossa battle in late June.

Did Tukhachevsky not know this? No, but the marshal was too anxious. According to his schedule, 1942 was a year to turn defeat into victory. In this year, he wanted to regain the land he lost last year and drive the German army out of the Soviet Union step by step. In that way, in 1943, he could counterattack in full, attack Germany in one fell swoop, and finally end the war at the end of the year.

It has to be said that the timetable set by Tukhachevsky was too compact. It was completely out of reality. In 1941, the Red Army lost about 1 million troops (including captured, sacrificed and injured), and had to go through rest and replenishment to recover its strength. He left too little time for rest and replenishment, or there was no time for rest and replenishment at all.

After all, the Red Army soldiers are humans and not machines, so it is impossible to pass the level in one go. According to Tukhachevsky's schedule, the Red Army will be exhausted in the second half of 1942. In the end, let alone driving away the enemy, it would be thankful that it would not collapse again.

The correct approach is that in the first half of 1942, at most, a battle was launched to rescue Kiev and stabilize the situation in Ukraine, and should be rested immediately and be prepared to deal with the German counterattack.

Between April and September, it is best to base yourself on defense and consume the German army's vitality through active defense. At the end of September, counterattacks will not be aimed at expelling the German army in an all-round way, but to seize the initiative on the battlefield and train troops. After entering 1943, a large-scale and comprehensive counterattack will be carried out.

"We must be prepared to fail Minsk's counterattack." Ulitsky said worriedly, "Once Minsk's counterattack fails, we will fall into a passive again. At that time, the enemy is likely to launch a new round of offensives. According to my judgment, there are two key directions for the enemy's attack, either Bryansk or Kiev. The latter is more likely. Once Kiev loses, the Ukrainian front is likely to be driven out of Ukraine in full, the front will develop northward, and the enemy will attack Moscow along Kursk."

Ubolevic still has two tricks. He has basically judged the trend on the battlefield in 1942. Under his prophecy, Tukhachevsky had to be dismissed in this year.

"Comrade Mikhail can no longer withstand another failure. The Military Commission and the Central Committee have reached the limit of patience with him. Even within the Trotskyists, the calls for opposition to him are getting higher and higher, and he has reached the so-called end of the way..."

Tukhachevsky was not aware of Ubolevic's predictions to him. At this time, he was planning the next Kiev rescue operation. Some comrades might be wondering. Didn't Tukhachevsky oppose this operation? How could he be so concerned?

That's right, Tukhachevsky opposed first resolving Kiev, but who made this a established strategy? Moreover, whether the Kiev rescue operation was successful was directly related to whether the Minsk counterattack he advocated was carried out. So even if he had a lot of opinions on resolving Kiev, Tukhachevsky could only pay more attention.

However, the focus of the General Staff was a bit strange. He only cared about which troops he invested to rescue Kiev, and he was very concerned about this. In this regard, Shaposhnikov, who was directly responsible for this battle, and Rokosovsky, who was indirectly supported, had a lot of opinions.

"Mikhail didn't want to invest the elite Red Army in Kiev, especially the precious mechanized troops," Shaposhnikov complained to Temuxingo, "He actually said that reinforcement of two armies is enough to rescue Kiev. Don't this bastard know that there are 500,000 enemies around Kiev? What are the two armies doing? When our Ukrainian Front is begging for food!"

Please note that Tukhachevsky did not say that the two armies could have served the 500,000 German troops. His meaning was that it was enough to strengthen the Ukrainian Front. It was equivalent to saying that the main force of this rescue operation was the Ukrainian Front, and the Red Army in other directions was enough.

What's even more annoying is that the so-called two armies that support the Ukrainian Front, one of which originally belonged to the Ukrainian Front, was the 6th Army of Rokosovsky. In order to win the Battle of Bryansk, the Military Commission formed the Bryansk Front. Among them, the Ukrainian Front allocated the 6th Army.

This time, Tukhachevsky meant that it was enough that the Bryansk Front would return the 6th Army and then draw another 19th Army from the Belarusian Front to support the Ukrainian Front.

To be honest, in this arrangement, Tukhachevsky was full of small calculations. According to his plan, as the main force in the future Minsk counterattack, the Belarusian Front only had to draw an army group to participate in the Kiev rescue operation, which naturally had the impact on Belarusian army preparations to be minimized. This was naturally a major benefit to him.

But is it really OK to do this? That is absolutely impossible. Let’s not talk about whether it is enough to support the two armies of the Ukrainian Front. Just talking about the two armies drawn, there are major problems.

For example, the 6th Army of the Bryansk Front Army suffered heavy losses in previous operations. When the Bryansk Defense War was launched, the army was only half of its strength left. After a fierce battle, part of its strength was consumed. It can be said that the army can only use one army in fact. What is this useful?

What's more, the Bryansk Front Army is very weak, with only five armies in total, of which the 6th and 16th armies are still disabled. The German army on their front is still relatively strong. It is a risky look no matter how you draw troops from here!

Then why did Tukhachevsky take such a risk? It's very simple. To preserve the strength of the Belarusian Front in Minsk. It's not even ruled out that this person deliberately wanted to make Kiev's rescue operation fail. Using this little force to rescue Kiev, he would probably be defeated by the German army at the beginning. The earlier the rescue operation ended, the more beneficial it would be for Minsk's counterattack. And he could also sit and watch the jokes of his political enemies. Why not do it?

However, Tukhachevsky's plan was good, but he could not make a fuss about how to carry out Kiev's rescue operations. Soon, Rokosovsky and Shaposhnikov filed a complaint to the Military Commission together, strongly condemning the General Staff's nonsense. Especially Triandafilov, the commander of the Moscow Central Military Region, was able to open fire and exclaimed Tukhachevsky with his face:

"Comrade Mikhail's core idea is that he still does not want to rescue Kiev, or does not implement the decisions of the Politburo and the Military Commission. This extremely irresponsible approach is a crime against Red Army soldiers!"

Soon, the Military Commission broke out in a new round of verbal criticism against the General Staff. Not to mention that Tukhachevsky was furious, Trotsky was also affected. At the regular meeting of the Politburo, Sverdlov violently criticized him for condoning Tukhachevsky's resolutions against the Politburo, and was just a conspiracy!

The conscience of heaven and earth, Trotsky really didn't have this intention. Although he hoped to start the Minsk counterattack first, the Politburo made a decision, and he could no longer be obsessed with it. Therefore, he had no intention of making bad or making trouble at all.

Who would have thought that Tukhachevsky was just clever on his back, which made Trotsky extremely passive and really wanted to catch Tukhachevsky. This time, even Trotsky could not tolerate it. He maintained and cared for Tukhachevsky again and again, not only did he not get any benefit, but was implicated by that person again and again. To be honest, he was really bored.

Especially when he thought about Ulitsky and Radick's previous evaluation of Tukhachevsky, Comrade Mikhail did have military talents, but he was a little arrogant, and it was difficult to unite his comrades around him, and even often refused to accept the correct opinions of others. He could not expand our influence in the military, and even had a counter-effect.

Trotsky didn't think it was so arrogant. Genius was always proud. However, he couldn't even expand the influence of the Trotskyists in the military, and he couldn't accept it even if there was a counter-effect. At first, he thought that Ulitsky and Radick were exaggerated, and felt that Tukhachevsky still had a group of important friends, such as Gamarnik and Khalepsky.

But soon Ulitsky and Radic cited a large number of counterexamples. Among the top leaders of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky was not very popular. Even Triandafilov and Ubolevicz, who were engaged in deep combat theory, parted ways. As for the newcomers with potential, neither the 1930s nor the 1940s, this person had discovered many talents, and was even worse than Voroshilov who had been defeated. That guy at least promoted a group of generals like Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Konev.

In short, that's not that good, and it's shocked. At this time, even Trotsky had to think carefully about the question of Tukhachevsky's stay or wherever he stayed... (To be continued.)

ps: Bow to thank Ma Shen**, Haochuan, sweet potatoes in the melon fields, Xicheng, Huyan Haha, the glorious charter, the highlight of Huiguang and Comrade Juventus!
Chapter completed!