Rommel did guess that the Allies would land from Normandy.

Rommel would make such a judgment, not because he knew the Allied forces' information, nor did he draw conclusions on his analysis of the terrain, nor did he predict it without any idea...

In fact, if it were merely analyzed from the topography, Calais was the most suitable place to land, so that Hitler firmly believed this and repeatedly emphasized that Calais was the focus of defense. Even Hitler ordered that no one could transfer troops from the Calais area without his approval.

Rommel could guess because he knew the Allies and knew that the Allies would not choose the enemy to attack with the positions where the fortifications were prepared and that the fortifications were very strong... The Germans stationed nineteen divisions in the Calais area, while there were only ten divisions in the Normandy area.

So Rommel naturally looked at Normandy, a barren land that no one else cared about.

However, although Rommel was a little helpless when he realized the danger of Normandy, it was mainly because the military power was not entirely in his hands, he just had the right to command... This should be considered Hitler's mistake. The German army in Normandy actually had two commanders, one was Rommel and the other was the older noble general Lundstedt.

As usual, grassroots civilian generals and noble generals looked down on each other, so they had no communication and coordination, and even broke up with each other.

What's worse is that the two people's opinions on the use of armored forces were completely opposite.

Lundstedt is praised as an expert in armored forces, and is also a staunch supporter of the Blitz, and can even be regarded as one of the founders... Bypassing the Maginot Line and forcing France to surrender was his masterpiece.

Originally, there was no problem with this, because Rommel himself was an expert in the armored forces and was also good at launching attacks on the enemy through blitz.

The problem is that Lundstedt was a nobleman who had never been on a tank and could not stand the dirty, greasy and noise, and never went deep into the lower troops to inspect the troops to check weapons and equipment... This made his theory a little out of reality and would not be flexible.

So he took it for granted that tanks were a kind of mobile equipment. Without mobile equipment, it was equivalent to coffins. What's more, the Allies also had sea control and air control. If the tanks were placed on the coastline, they would become an excellent target for enemy fighter jets and warships.

Therefore, Lundstedt suggested deploying the armored troops a hundred kilometers behind the defense line, so that they could avoid being bombed by enemy fighter jets and naval guns, and then use the maneuverability of tanks to rush to the front for reinforcements.

This theory sounds completely correct and has been verified again and again in the war, so no one can refute him.

But the battlefield has never been a constant place. Lundstedt's theory may be correct elsewhere, but it has been proven completely wrong on the specific battlefield of Normandy.

Rommel believes that without air supremacy, armored forces will become targets of the enemy wherever they are deployed, and in this regard it is more advantageous to deploy on the coastline than to deploy in the rear.

The reason is simple, because deploying in the rear requires a maneuvering process, during which the armored forces will be exposed to the enemy's air force and will be wiped out, and they may not even have the chance to fire a shot at the enemy.

On the contrary, it is deployed on the front line without this problem. As long as the tank is built with suitable bunkers and camouflage, it is difficult for enemy warships and fighter jets to discover these hidden tanks.

More importantly, Rommel believes that the biggest feature of this battle is that the army and equipment are extremely different from each other: the German army had only forty divisions in northern France, with a total strength of less than 500,000, while the enemy had millions (at this time Rommel did not know the specific forces of the Allied forces) and also had sea control and air control. In addition, the Allied forces also had sufficient supplies and more advanced equipment.

In this case, the German army had only one possibility to win, that is, to block the Allies at sea.

Therefore, the first day of this battle is very important and even decisive. If the German army loses in the first day of the war, then the Allies will open a breakthrough on the coastline, and then millions of well-equipped troops will pour into France like a flood that breaks the dam... The German army has no chance to turn defeat into victory.

If the first day is victorious, that is, the German army successfully blocks the Allies' offensive location, then the German army can calmly strengthen its defense.

At this time, the Allied forces and equipment advantages could not be reflected, because they could only launch attacks from the sea against the Germans hiding in solid fortifications one by one.

Therefore, Rommel repeatedly emphasized: "The 24 hours after the battle starts are the key. This day will be the longest day for both the Allies and us! On this day, we must exert all the energy of all the troops on the beach, and even orderly soldiers must carry rifles to the battlefield!"

It is precisely because of this that Rommel believes that deploying armored troops a hundred kilometers away is absolutely wrong, and it will not have any positive effect on the battlefield.

But Lundstedt did not agree with Rommel's idea. He even convinced Guderian that the two armored soldiers experts met Hitler several times, saying that the armored troops must not be handed over to Rommel and used as it planned, otherwise it would be a disaster for the armored troops!

Hitler could not judge who was right and who was wrong, because both sides' theories sounded reasonable, so he made a foolish decision, dividing the seven armored divisions in northern France into two, three armored divisions to Rommel, and four armored divisions to Lundstedt.

Rommel was powerless to do anything about this, so he could only do his best to match the three armored divisions he had handed to. These three armored divisions even included two of the 21st and 116th armored divisions that had suffered heavy losses and had not been fully reorganized. Of course, they had not recovered their combat effectiveness.

Fortunately, Rommel was restricted by all parties, otherwise the Allies would not be able to survive this "longest day" smoothly.

Of course, Eisenhower and others were not clear about these inside stories, so they could only guess the intentions of the German army based on the existing situation.

Unlike Eisenhower, Zhang Chi is very sure that landing from Normandy will work, so he will not be worried about gains and losses like Eisenhower and others.

"So!" Zhang Chi concluded: "What we have to do is to follow the original plan, conduct training and preparations on the one hand, and continue to confuse the enemy on the other hand!"
Chapter completed!