If he only knows practical staff and does not write a summary of military tactics like Jomini and Clausewitz, Zhuge Liang would not deserve to be Zhuge Liang.

But in the same way, if he only summed up military tactics like Jomini and Clausewitz, but his actual staff and his usual role in the war always plays the defeated side, then he is not worthy of being Zhuge Liang.

The reason why Zhuge Liang was Zhuge Liang was naturally because he had to study as Jomini and Clausewitz, and actually had to fight Xiang Yu/Napoleon, Han Xin/Moltke. He had the peak of theory and practice, so that he could be a lifetime worthy of being a human being.

Shortly after writing "The Art of War. Internal and Outer Chapter", Zhuge Liang gave his manuscripts to Guan Yu for reference. Just as Yomini gave his manuscripts to the emperor in history, he listened to Guan Yu's supplementary opinions based on his many years of experience.

On the other hand, due to the progress of the battle situation, Liu Bei's camp and Yuan Shao's camp just passed through the early stage of the Battle of Hanoi, and had to move into a large-scale stalemate stage where both sides invested more than 100,000 or 200,000 troops.

Therefore, the experiences that Zhuge Liang had just summarized were used and he got an opportunity to test them in practice.

Based on his observations of Guan Yu, Zhuge Liang fine-tuned the entry time, rhythm, and entry position of subsequent reinforcements based on his recent conversion to new logistics of the troops, as well as the newly summarized military strategy theory.

To put it bluntly, the essence of Zhuge Liang's military strategy is to completely discuss the issue of "how to make it easier for oneself to concentrate superior forces on local battlefields, to attack the time difference between the enemy and annihilate the enemy from one to another" from the inside out.

From Xiang Yu and Han Xin to Napoleon Moltke, all the changes in the situation and the evolution of science and technology are calculated and all the effective variables are considered to achieve overall overall coordination.

If you implement this upright military idea in practice, the benefits will naturally be amazing.

Throughout late November, Yuan Shao invested nearly 200,000 reinforcements in the Hanoi-Bingzhou battlefield, and arrived in multiple batches in more than ten days. In addition, the remaining nearly 20,000 people from Tuo Yi and Zhang Liao, and the 30,000 Wen Chou, the total strength of Yuan's army in the entire Bingzhou battlefield in Hanoi reached an astonishing 250,000.

At the same time, Liu Bei also successively invested the strategic reserve team left in Guanzhong and Ma Chao, who was responsible for restraining Lu Bu on the Northern Front, to Hanoi and Hedong, with a total investment of 90,000 troops. In addition to Guan Yu's original 60,000 troops, the total strength of Liu Bei's army on the front line was expanded to 150,000.

The strategic reserve team in Liu Bei's hands and the Zhang Fei of Hongnong have only 50,000 left, which can be considered as a bet that can bet on the top.

So, as both sides continue to increase troops on a large scale and strategic maneuver at the front line, with more than 100,000 people, Zhuge Liang's newly summarized guiding ideology of "making choices based on the advantages of the inside and outside lines according to the current conditions and local conditions, and ensuring that the benefits of concentrating superior forces on one's own side have been maximized" specifically for the Liu Bei camp?

By giving a brief example, you can see that the benefits are really quite a lot.

For example, on November 20th, Guan Yu took advantage of the failure of Tuo Yi to rescue Zhang Liao and pretended to use the same trick again, and changed to "taking advantage of Zhang Liao and Wen Chou's meeting, but Tuo Yi returned to his camp time difference and attacked Huai County, the capital of Hanoi County, where Tuo Yi had an empty defense force."

Then, Wen Chou, Zhang Liao, Tuo Yi was indeed frightened. He was afraid that history would repeat itself, so he brought his troops to the north bank of Huai County, east of Tuo Yi's old camp, and gave up the road to block Guan Yu in other directions.

But in fact, Zhuge Liang did not let Guan Yu use his old tricks again, but just scared the enemy. After mobilizing the enemy to the northwest and gathering together, Guan Yu actually chose to kill a retaliation and attack the counties in the enemy-occupied areas west of the Ye Wang and that had not been restored by Guan Yu.

Try to take the opportunity to open up the main channel between Hedong and Hanoi and along the Yellow River. Get rid of the only dependence on the logistics routes that had to be supplied through Fenshui and Qinshui.

However, because Zhang Liao and Wen Chou were afraid that Tuo Yi would be annihilated, he let go of the threat to Guan Yu's road to turn west, and did not notice Guan Yu's mobilization as soon as possible.

At the same time, the reinforcements from the Han army from Hedong achieved more precise maneuvering cooperation under Zhuge Liang's more meticulous overall coordination and dispatch. The tens of thousands of troops as reserve teams should reach which position on which day and where the enemy should be surrounded from which direction, all of which are calculated accurately.

In an era without modern communication tools and transportation, to ensure this, we must have a very thorough understanding of the geographical environment and weather conditions between Hedong and Hanoi. These are not overnight. They were conducted many practical investigations these days after Zhuge Liang arrived at the Yewang.

The most noble and precise terrain survey, detailed calculation of river mileage, and all the twists and turns of Qinshui Qingshui Yellow River in these river sections are calculated, rather than simply estimating the straight line distance of the river.

From the perspective of finding many wild kings and experienced local farmers in Qinshui, they asked them about the weather conditions in Hanoi every winter, and even made a "weather history record of a certain month and a certain day of the lunar calendar in previous years" as much as possible.

This is already a bit similar to the work of modern meteorological statistics. Those units that do weather forecasting relied on large-scale statistical historical records to evaluate when science and technology were underdeveloped in the early years.

Therefore, there is no such thing as "those who are born to know the astronomy and geography, and when they count the star signs at night, they can tell that the sun and rain can pray for the east wind." These are all real results of statistics, calculations and experiments in science and engineering. Especially in this life, Zhuge Liang's scientific thinking inherited from Li Su, and naturally became more realistic than Zhuge Liang's original period in history, and more theoretically combined with practice.

The most obvious benefit of doing so much work is that when Liu Bei's reinforcements advance, they always appear in front of Yuan Shao's side alone or in the lonely defenders behind enemy lines.

As mentioned earlier, after the fall of the Yewang, there were actually several garrison troops behind Guan Yu's side, including 5,000 guards of Zhuoguan Pass, 5,000 guards of Jiguan Pass, and 10,000 guards of Dongyuan County, which belonged only to Yuan Shao's Hedong Prefect.

These three troops have 20,000 people, and other surrounding defense areas are scattered and thousands of miscellaneous local guards. The king of the wild was originally lost. After Tuo Yi and Zhang Liao were frustrated, they should retreat and gather, and they should retreat and gather. They should wait for friendly troops to receive them.

If the above three places cannot be defended, these troops will also move closer to the bank of the Yellow River to the south, and use Yuan Shao's army to still control the absolute river control rights of the section below Sanmenxia of the Yellow River and withdraw the waterway.

However, because Tuo Yi and Zhang Liao were frightened by Guan Yu's vileness, they delayed for a few more days and did not have time to order them to move closer to the bank of the Yellow River. At the same time, Yuan Shaojun was slow in large-scale strategic maneuvering efficiency and unfavorable cooperation of more than 100,000 people. The various divisions did not know where the friendly forces were. All kinds of disconnections led to slow deployment of other backhand response plans.

In contrast, Zhuge Liang immediately notified Yan Yan, who was in Wenxi County, to go forward without caring about the whole army and launching a siege attack in Dongyuan, dragging the Dongyuan defenders to prevent them from abandoning the city and running away immediately.

At the same time, Zhuge Liang's orders to Yan Yan were also very accurate, and he should go to where he should arrive every day, how to deal with and overcome when he encountered difficult weather, and under what circumstances could some troops take the lead, and all the arrangements were clearly arranged.

In addition to Yan Yan from Wenxi's front line, Zhuge Liang issued a transfer order to reinforcements from various rear divisions in the name of Guan Yu, which was so meticulous that he helped to think about the logistics difficulties in advance, so that the progress of reinforcements filling the front line was very silky.

In terms of logistics, due to insufficient materials, the troops had to wait for food and tents to continue to drive out, but there was no one at all. From Ma Chao, Wu Ban, Huang Quan, Guan Ping, Meng Da, Feng Xi and other departments, they all had their support on time.

(Note: In order to confront Yuan Shao in a comprehensive confrontation, Liu Bei also adjusted personnel work, allowing some civil servants of the nine ministers to temporarily hold military positions in the military and provide staff to the frontline generals. Tingwei Zhengfa was transferred to Ma Chao's army, and Pang Tong was sent to Zhang Fei's army.)

I dare not say that Zhuge Liang's logistics coordination rhythm was as rigorous as the German army in the Moltke era, but it was already the optimization before modern times.

With such rapid encirclement, the final result was that the reinforcements from Dongyuan County had no time to retreat into the Yellow River along the Qingshui River waterway, and were stuck in advance by the Han army and then interspersed into place.

Similarly, the Yuan army in Zhiguanxing and Jiguanxing were also delayed by a small number of Guanyu troops, and at the same time, they did not allow Tuo Yi to respond and rescue in time. Then Yan Yan and Huang Quan Guanping led the troops and forcibly marched around Dongyuan before the Dongyuan fell, and flowed downstream to the bank of the Yellow River south of Zhuguanxing.

The strategic maneuvering speed of the Han army reinforcements was even faster than that of the Yuan Shao army in his own occupied areas under normal circumstances. In the end, they were all interspersed and divided and surrounded.

Although some troops have not been annihilated, they are essentially equivalent to being annihilated.

In the last few days of November, the Yuan army in Dongyuan County felt hopeless. After a brief resistance, they put down their weapons and surrendered to Liu Bei's side.

After entering early December, the Yuan army in Zhuguanxing and Jiguanxing also surrendered. Their fighting and resistance before surrender were even worse than Dongyuan County. After all, the latter is still a county town with a larger depth, and there are also considerable supplies and food stored in the city to survive the winter.

The Zhuguanxing and other places are just a checkpoint, with a shallow depth from east to west. After the way to retreat to the Yellow River was cut off, the checkpoint was attacked by the Han army at the same time, and there was no defense depth at all. The morale collapsed in just two days.

Therefore, in the stalemate of the movement of increasing troops to fill the front line in just over half a month, more than 20,000 Yuan's army was wiped out by the Han army because of insufficient mobility and untimely retreating.

Since the start of the Hedong-Hanoi-Bingzhou battle, Guan Yu's side first annihilated thousands of Bingzhou soldiers in Duanshi and Fuze, and then in Shimen, Qinshui and Yewang wiped out a total of 10,000 enemies, and more than 10,000 enemies were killed in the field outside Yewang City. Finally, more than 20,000 were restored to the west of Yewang County and Hedong Dongyuan.

Within one month, 50,000 living forces in Yuan Shao's camp were annihilated and all the land west of the Ye Wang was lost. Although it entered a static stalemate stage where each other filled the front confrontation zone, its morale was terrible.

Coupled with the historical shadow of the "Battle of Changping", Yuan Shao's camp felt that he could no longer fight and could only defend himself.
Chapter completed!